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INTRODUCTON AND GOALS OF THE STUDY
Th e turning of Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies on the path of building a market economy, their subsequent 
integration into the European Union’s economic space, and fi nding their place in it is a geo-economic process of pan-European 
or even broader signifi cance that takes decades. It has not always been possible to adequately foresee the continuation of this 
process, the acceleration or slowing of economic growth, faster development of integration or its obstruction. Th e same 
goes for the dynamics of more global processes and crises, which all exert their infl uence on events in our region. Politicians 
as well as economists have off ered unjustifi ably optimistic forecasts and sometimes created groundlessly bleak scenarios. 
Th eoretical bases for interpreting, directing and monitoring these ongoing processes have usually been hastily draft ed “on 
the move” and then adjusted to conform to the current reality. As examples we can mention the economic transition theory, 
the “catching-up” types of approaches, and theoretical positions according to which the economic integration and various 
types of harmonisation were organised. Of course, there were certain more general theoretical foundations in the fi elds, such 
as the theory of economic growth, theories on international trade, developmental economics, etc., but all these were quite 
general and linking them to particular time periods and the specifi cs of the region was anything but easy. 
Th e countries of the CEE region underwent several stages aft er escaping from the command economy, imposed geopolitical 
ties and communist ideology. Th is was the following sequence of stages characteristic for many countries: economic decline 
related to the system’s change, during which the reorganisation of the economy according to market economy requirements 
had to be carried out (liberalisation, stabilisation, privatisation), followed by an initial growth period, then frequently some 
kind of intermediate crisis, preparations for EU integration (harmonisation), a period of new economic growth caused by 
EU accession (the eff ect of better access to markets as well as available structural funds), the decline caused by the global 
economic crisis, and then recovery as well as a new, but not very impressive growth period. While it was possible during the 
fi rst six–seven years of this cycle to rely on the recently formulated economic transition theory, which, formulating it simply, 
merely prompted which moves to make and in which order so as to hope for new growth, aft erwards there was no theoretical 
basis available for the subsequent developments, unless the excessively simplifi ed liberalisation propaganda and claims of the 
necessity of a “thin state” can be considered one. 
Various convergence estimates and forecasts were popular in the EU accession period, as well as the European Commission’s 
consultations in draft ing various development measures, showing how to reduce the gap between the new members and 
the core countries with the help of the structural funds and Brussels-recommended support programmes. While the new 
members did not have many opportunities during the accession negotiations to adjust the integration process according 
to their specifi c needs (besides applying for transition periods of limited durations), the EU fi nancial support for the 
development of infrastructure and the funding of development policies improved CEE countries’ opportunities to better 
cope with EU market pressure as well as that of the globalisation process in the wider sense. 
Aft er the end of the global economic crisis the new EU members were already regular members who no longer received 
as intensive attention as previously, while their economic growth and general development tended to slow down. Th e 
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productivity of the new members looked as if it would remain signifi cantly lower than that of the old ones. Keywords like 
growth ceilings and development ceilings became relevant.1 
In fact, even during the pre-crisis boom period there were symptoms revealing that CEE countries’ economic growth lacked 
a sustainable nature: with rising wages and increasing costs of other economic inputs it became necessary to rearrange the 
structure of the economy to enter a new stage of economic development, based on a knowledge economy. However, the 
CEE economies were not ready for this. In fact, they were not the only ones in Europe to face that problem. Vengelers and 
Mrak fi nd when analysing the economic growth dynamics of the Visegrád Group of new EU members and the EU cohesion 
countries (the countries joining the EU before the post-socialist group, predominantly Southern European states) that in case 
of either group their economic growth accelerated and the developmental gap with the old EU members shrank signifi cantly, 
especially among the post-socialist countries, but then the growth engine lost momentum.2 Economic growth reached a 
limit that reduced the development rate and did not permit them to catch up as rapidly as the East Asian growth champions 
had shown.3 When analysing the slowing of this catching-up process, the authors reached an important conclusion: within-
industry spillover eff ects are as either absent or very weak. Th e reasons are, in case of fi rms owned by foreign investors, their 
relative isolation from the other economies of the location countries, and in case of fi rms based on domestic capital, their low 
levels of business sophistication and limited ability to form clusters. 
Th ere seems to be a lack of clarity regarding the growth potential of the new member countries and the conditions for 
releasing it. Th is article attempts to introduce, in order to further study the development prospects of the CEE countries, 
the treatment used by E. Wallerstein about semi-periphery countries and semi-periphery economies, i.e. the countries and 
economies that are located between the core and the periphery, and possess the features of both groups (more about it later 
on).4 Th is is not a very unequivocal or operational concept, which certainly needs further elaboration before using, but the 
approach proposed by Wallerstein has several attractive qualities. First, it concentrates attention on the external relations and 
dependencies of a country’s economy, its position and role in the world economy. Th is approach is essentially structuralist, 
and postulates the existence of long-term dependencies. For these two reasons its emphasis is somewhat diff erent than that 
of the middle-income trap concept, which has been quite widely used so far.5 Both address the situation where the countries 
that do not belong among the wealthiest or poorest ones tend to experience a standstill of growth in a certain stage of 
development primarily due to the increasing cost of production. Yet the concept of the middle-income trap concentrates 
more on the domestic factors of the economy of the country under observation, while the semi-periphery concept focuses 
1 Goeke, H.and Hüther, M., 2016. Regional Convergence in Europe, Leibnitz Information Centre for Economics; Parscariu G.C. and 
M.A.P. de Silva Duarte (ed.), 2017. Core Periphery Patterns across the European Union: Case Studies and Lessons from Eastern and 
Southern Europe. Emerald Publishing; Kaletovic D., 2018. Has Eastern European Economic Growth Hit a Ceiling?, Schafehaven 
Market Insider, 20th of August.
2 R. Veugelers and Mrak M., 2009. Th e Knowledge Economy and Catching-up Member States of the European Union, Report 
prepared for Commissioner’s Potocnik’s Expert Group, “Knowledge for Growth”. In case of the Baltic States the growth continued but 
since it was largely based on the infl ow of cheap fi nancial capital thanks to the European Central Bank’s interest policy rather than 
the actual competitiveness of the economy, which declined due to growth in wages, this growth ended with a very steep fall during 
the international economic crisis. 
3 Observing the growth rate of the more successful CEE countries in the period following the end of the economic decline caused 
by the change of regime shows that the leading CEE countries’ growth rates were comparable to that of the East Asian “tigers”. Yet 
a study of a longer time period and consideration of the CEE countries’ growth slowdown makes it evident that the East Asian 
countries’ catching up process has been signifi cantly more sustainable. Further details see: Terk E., 2015. Practicing Catching up: a 
Comparison of Development Models of East Asian and Central Eastern European Countries. Frankfurt: Peter Lang Verlag.
4 Wallerstein I. M., 1976. Semi-Peripheral Countries and the Contemporary World Crisis. Th eory and Society. Elsevier; Giovanni 
Arrighi G. and J. Drangel., 1986. Th e Stratifi cation of the World Economy: An Exploration of the Semiperipheral Zone. Review 10:9.
5 Shekhar A. et al, 2013. Growth Slowdowns and the Middle-Income Trap. IMF Working Paper.
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more on outside factors and dependencies.6 Secondly, the concept of semi-periphery countries considers that the relation 
between the core and the peripheries occurs in a geographic space and are, as a rule, long-term. Th is permits the set of 
instruments of geo-economics and geopolitics to be used to analyse these relations. As a rule the cores are dominant in the 
geographically closer peripheries and semi-peripheries. Th irdly, the developments of the CEE economies have so far been 
predominantly treated “in their own juice”, the development of some CEE countries has been compared only with other CEE 
countries—which ones passed the transition better, showed the fastest growth, achieved better cooperation with the EU core 
countries, etc. Analysis in the context of semi-periphery countries permits the span of the analysis to be eff ectively doubled to 
a global dimension, comparing the development of the CEE countries and their prospects not only with Southern European 
semi-periphery countries but, if so desired, with semi-periphery countries in South America. Of course, this would attract 
greater interest if it should appear that there are suffi  cient common features among the semi-periphery countries’ parameters, 
economic behaviour and problems they face. 
While preparing the present article we set the following goals: 
  To verify whether the economies traditionally considered as semi-periphery economies form a relatively homogeneous 
body (or bodies) in reality. If no, there would be no reason to use this concept as a basis or the definition of semi-periphery 
economies should be significantly adjusted. The CEE economies are studied in this analysis as one of the specimens of 
semi-periphery economies; 
  To determine which features are common for the body of semi-periphery economies under observation as a whole and 
which for their more specific manifestations; 
  To test the constancy in time (over a 10–12-year period) of the homogeneities of the general complex of semi-periphery 
countries and its sub-groups;
  To study the changes of the positioning in the world economy of two European semi-periphery economic bodies in 
comparison with the world’s core economies and the economies that have succeeded in leaping from one stratum of 
economic development to another within recent decades; 
  To clarify important changes in the development indicators characterising semi-periphery countries’ economies occurring 
in a time period, including the indicators of the final state of their economic success and the indicators of the most 
important factors contributing to development;
  To try to identify the factors mainly influencing the changes in the final state (positioning) and the factors possibly 
obstructing the movement of their economies to a better position; 
  After carrying out the analysis, to derive conclusions regarding the opportunities for further use of the semi-periphery 
concept and the limits of its implementation. 
On the approaches to the semi-periphery category
Th e division of states into three groups—the periphery, the core and the semi-periphery—is primarily known from the 
Wallerstein World Systems Th eory, yet the use of approaches based on diff erentiation between the core and the periphery 
and in that framework highlighting the semi-periphery as an interface stratum is not principally alien to other schools and 
6 In case of the concept of the middle-income trap, the proposed solutions focus on the diversifi cation of the hitherto too unilateral 
economic structure, suppressing domestic corruption, measures for creating a wider wealthy middle class, whose demand could 
help to invigorate the domestic market, etc. Work on the middle-income trap also seems to be meant for countries only recently 
emerging from the stage of cheap and elementary, e.g. resource-based economy; in case of economies at the development level of 
the Czech Republic or Slovenia, which face the need to change their economies’ positioning in the international economy, such 
recommendations may prove insuffi  cient.
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authors either (e.g. Paul Krugman’s new trade theory/new economic geography). It is presumed that what is happening in the 
core has a very strong impact on the periphery (and the semi-periphery); fi guratively speaking, the core shapes the periphery 
for itself, the core-periphery system possesses a certain stability, and it is not that easy to move between the strata within these 
systems. Of course, it depends on the various concepts of how stable or unchanging these structures are viewed or whether 
one core or several are discussed, etc. 
Th e Wallerstein school, when studying the hierarchic domination relations treated in the core-periphery theory, primarily 
proceeds from the pattern of international economic relations as basic, and the question of political domination is not 
ignored, but treated as secondary in the framework of established economic dependencies.
Th e World Systems analysis, which was initiated by Wallerstein, defi nes semi-periphery regions as the primary structural 
elements in the economy of the world. Semi-periphery is more than a description, as it also serves as a position within 
the world hierarchy in which economic and social change can be interpreted. Wallerstein claims that these regions play a 
signifi cant role when it comes to mediating the economic, political and social, activities linking the periphery region with 
the core. Th ey allow the possibility of dominance over the periphery region. Semi-periphery countries can serve to alleviate 
the political pressures that the core can exert upon the periphery and the political unrest that the periphery can direct back 
to the core. Th us they stabilise the World System by their existence. Th ey are exploited by the core region while exploiting 
the periphery region itself. 
However, S. Babones and P. Babcicky7 describe in their article Wallerstein’s explanation of the origins of the semi-periphery 
as a bit teleological (it exists because if it did not exist the system would not be stable) and a bit improbable (we don’t see 
much evidence of systematic semi-peripheral exploitation of the periphery), yet they fi nd that that this intermediate stratum 
exists in reality and that the category of semi-periphery would be, aft er carrying out the necessary elaborations, a useful 
instrument for analysis.
A. Giddens believes that Wallerstein’s concept has made a major contribution by enabling the typical temptation of orthodox 
sociology to treat social changes as predominantly endogenic to be overcome within the framework of the concept. Admittedly, 
he also criticises Wallerstein for insuffi  cient recognition of the autonomy of the (foreign) political and military factors from 
the economic one, since the concentration of political and military power in the world does not unequivocally proceed from 
economic concentration.8 He cites Wallerstein’s specifi c interpretation of the concept of capitalism as the reason for this drawback.
Indeed, there have been several attempts in recent decades to elaborate on and develop the concept of semi-periphery. One 
of them, for instance, is the attempt to diff erentiate between the semi-core and semi-peripheral specialisation profi les in the 
international economy.9 Th e authors relate the former to specialisation in complex industry in particular and thus consider 
it more promising. One option for diff erentiation between core economies on the one hand and the semi-core or semi-
periphery economies on the other is to concentrate on the state’s capability of maintaining its positive balance of payments 
long-term. For instance, if Spain should be incapable of achieving that, it should not be included among the core economies, 
as a negative balance of payments is a sign of a state’s inability to manage independently and its descent in the role of a 
dependent economy.10 
Th e approach more typical to political science considers it important to distinguish between the semi-periphery accepting its 
dependence on the core with probable perspectives of stagnation and the semi-periphery attempting to follow an independent 
economic policy. Th e latter variant is related to the concept of state activism and the strong state.11
7 Babones S. and Ph. Babcicky, 2011. Russia and East—Central Europe in the Modern World System: A Structuralist Perspective.
8 Giddens A. and S. Griffi  ths, 2006. Sociology (5th Edition). Polity Press.
9 Bohle D. and B. Greskovits, 2012. Capitalist Diversity on Europe’s Periphery. Cornell University Press.
10 Braeu R., 2018. Is Spain Becoming Semi-Core? Standish Market Insights, February 2018.
11 Babones S. and Ph. Babcicky, 2011. Russia and East Central Europe in the Modern World System: A Structuralist Perspective.
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Wallerstein’s theory and the quite closely related dependency theory have been criticised for their inability to suffi  ciently 
refl ect the realities of the 21st century, especially globalisation (the decline of the role of the states and the rise of the role 
of transnational corporations, etc.). Th is criticism is partly justifi ed, but as several authors12 have emphasised, this does 
not mean that the semi-periphery has disappeared in the 21st century world or that the signifi cance of this category has 
declined. It does mean that this category needs certain reappraisal and elaboration based on newly acquired material. Th e 
period of globalisation has brought along signifi cant changes in the international division of labour as well as the relations 
between economics and politics, while, as the latest developments have shown, the development of globalisation need not be 
irreversible and accelerating; there may be setbacks and globalisation may undergo modifi cations. 
One of the arguments brought out against the use of the semi-periphery category claims that the dependencies are much 
more complicated in the contemporary world. Some countries, for example oil-producing countries, may be interpreted 
as a periphery from one viewpoint, and very much a core from the other. Additionally, regional domestic diff erences have 
increased in today’s countries, including those of CEE. Would it be proper to describe for example Hungary as a semi-
periphery country if Budapest is a quite wealthy city?13 Such objections partially derive from considerations of prestige: 
the EU member countries, for example, are not very willing to be related to the (semi-) periphery and prefer emphasising 
that admission to the EU should guarantee a state’s sterling quality and is suffi  cient for feeling like a part of the core, either 
economically or politically.
Although there is no unequivocal understanding of which countries should be considered new semi-peripheries, this category 
is usually seen as covering the so-called cohesion countries of the southern part of the EU (Portugal, Greece, Cyprus, Spain)14, 
most of the former post-socialist countries of Europe, and primarily East Asian countries: aft er Japan, Taiwan, which has 
chosen the export-centred development strategy, South Korea, Th ailand, Malaysia, and the People’s Republic of China as 
a rising star as well. Singapore has already moved on to a status somewhere between a semi-periphery and core economy. 
Th e western part of Asia provides Turkey and Israel, sometimes also Iran and Lebanon. In case of the American continent 
it includes the more highly developed part of South and Central American countries (Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Mexico, 
for some authors also Brazil). In Africa only the Republic of South Africa is sometimes mentioned. Th e above list does not 
include all countries that have displayed rapid economic growth and improved their positions in GDP-based rankings. Some 
of the “upwardly mobile” countries are, according to their economic and social parameters, still periphery countries, which 
could be described as capable of exiting the status of periphery economies provided that their growth will continue: India, 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Regarding India and Brazil it can be argued that they have only partly reached 
the economic wealth necessary for semi-periphery status (some wealthier provinces). Yet the existing literature is not very 
homogeneous concerning this issue, as some of these states are interpreted by some authors as semi-periphery countries.15 
Th e issue of distinguishing between the semi-periphery and the core is also a problematic one, which actually has not been 
discussed profoundly enough. Th ere is no doubt that the former semi-periphery country Japan has long ago become a core 
country, while Singapore should also be included among the core, considering its level of development and wealth. Taiwan 
12 Worth O. and Ph. Moore (ed.), 2009. “Globalization and the ‘New’ Semi-Peripheries”. Palgrave & Macmillan.
13 Bod P. A., 2015. A World of Peripheries—Hungarian Review, vol. VI, No. 5.
14 Some authors also include Austria.
15 Authors with a political science or sociology background do not usually consider the lower limit of a state’s wealth important to treat 
it as a semi-periphery country. Th eir approach proceeds from the role the state performs in the World System and an important 
role, at least politically, can also be played by countries with a low per capita GDP. Yet “lumping together” countries with very 
diff erent levels of wealth reduces the meaning of the comparative analyses of their economic development; the behavioural patterns 
of countries of diff erent levels of wealth cannot be too similar. For example, comparison of the economic behavioural patterns 
of Austria and Brazil is unlikely to yield meaningful additional information. It seems that the Wallerstein school tends to list in 
particular the larger countries as semi-peripheries. Representatives of the World Systems Th eory consider the political strength 
factor important in maintaining dominance or vice versa breaking it up and escaping dominance; larger states thus inevitably shift  to 
the foreground. Larger countries also possess a greater ability to marshal their economic resources and thus lead a more independent 
economic policy.
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and the Republic of Ireland could be placed somewhere between the semi-periphery and the core as well. Th eir GDP per 
capita level is comparable to the core countries as to its per capita GDP and wage levels, although it still displays features 
characteristic of a semi-periphery country as to its role in the international economy and some other indicators, e.g. the dual 
economic structure, where the foreign capital-based part of the economy, including a large share of the high-technology 
sector, operates in relative separation from the rest of the country’s economy. South Korea, on the other hand, is clearly a 
semi-periphery country as to the aforementioned indicators, yet as to its role in the international economy and positioning 
in global value chains is similar to a core country. 
In case of several unevenly developed Southern European countries (Italy, Spain) it can be argued that only a certain 
geographic part of them has shift ed to the core countries’ trajectory (e.g. Northern Italy) rather than the entire state.16
Th e vagueness in defi ning the category of semi-periphery is also caused in Wallerstein’s case apparently by the fact that he 
operated with this category on a historically long timeline spanning centuries; therefore, it is diffi  cult to fi nd a defi nition that 
would be adequate in the 17th as well as the 21st centuries, for example. In the most general way the semi-periphery countries 
are defi ned as countries with average industrialisation and income levels,17 but this leaves their profi le of specialisation open. 
Earlier it meant the production of predominantly agricultural products and raw materials for the core countries; at present 
mainly less sophisticated work in the manufacturing value chain,18 and in the future maybe the supply of certain types of 
services. 
In theory, the primary criterion for designating the semi-periphery remains their similar role in the international division 
of labour along with the resulting peculiarities, rather than their wealth and standard of living. For example, most authors 
have problems in defi ning the wealthy oil-producing countries as belonging to either the core or the semi-periphery and 
view them as a separate category. It could be argued in principle of course that the semi-periphery countries are of average 
wealth at the global level, yet this zone of wealth varies quite widely, starting from per capita GDP of some USD 18,000 (this 
is more or less the world average and the PRC has just reached it) and reaching approximately USD 40,000 per capita or 
slightly above that (the level of South Korea and Spain). In the ranking of wealth this means the range roughly between 30th 
and 75th places .19
Developing methodology for empirical study
In order to fi nd answers to the questions posed at the beginning of the article we developed a methodology for the empirical 
study, which will be described below.
Th e study concentrated on two groups of semi-periphery countries in Europe.20 First, the eight CEE countries that acceded to 
the EU in 2004, and Croatia, which joined in 2013. Hereinaft er it will be designated as the CEE group. Secondly, the so-called 
16 Globalisation, by creating quilt-type development, reinforces this tendency.
17 For example Giddens A. and S. Griffi  ths, 2006. Sociology (5th Edition). Polity Press. 
18 A certain diff erence exists between CEE countries and Eastern European countries, e.g. Russia. While the CEE countries have 
entered the world economy mainly through manufacturing, Russia is involved predominantly as a processor of raw materials. 
19 Dependent on whether the list includes some microstates like San Marino and St Kitts and Nevis and special-status territories like 
Macao. Some rankings compiled for comparing diff erent development indicators include them, while others do not.
20 More precisely: the countries regarding which we could presume that the progress of the study will confi rm, based on their links 
with international economy, economic parameters and economic behavioural patterns, that they belong to the group of countries 
that could be generally described as semi-periphery countries. We could not completely rule out that the economies of some 
countries selected for the sample would have more in common with the economies of core countries or other genuine periphery 
countries. We did not consider it necessary to start the study with a highly accurate defi nition of semi-periphery country/economy; 
the study was rather viewed as a measure for elaborating such defi nitions. 
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cohesion countries of the EU—Spain, Portugal and Greece—along with Cyprus, which joined the EU in 2004. Hereaft er they 
will be collectively described as the Southern group of the semi-periphery countries. 
Th e fact that all the countries under observation are members of the EU should improve the comparability of the results. 
A questionable solution is the omission of Bulgaria and Romania from the sample of countries, while Croatia has been 
included in it. An argument in favour of including Croatia in the sample was the fact that its neighbour Slovenia, another 
former part of Yugoslavia, was among the countries being studied. Th is opened a certain opportunity to treat the CEE 
countries, if so desired, as two sub-groups: the northern and the southern (south-eastern). 
We also feared that the inclusion of Bulgaria as a country of signifi cantly lower per capita GDP than the others would make 
the sample too heterogeneous as to economic wealth (from Spain’s and Malta’s per capita GDP at USD 38–39,000 to Bulgaria’s 
level of USD 20,000). 
In addition to the two groups of semi-periphery countries, two reference groups were used in the study: a group of seven core 
countries/economies and a group of so-called breakthrough economies, including six countries. 
Since the borders between the core and semi-periphery countries are quite vague in theoretical works, we attempted to use 
the strictest selection criteria of the core countries, i.e. by including the countries that have stood out for a long period for 
their high wealth levels and that are also known as homes of large, multinational corporations. Th ese are the countries whose 
economic and international policies display a defi nite international extent. Th e sample was formed so as to also include 
smaller countries in addition to great powers. Th e group includes the US, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland and Japan.
Th e reference group of the breakthrough economies included the countries that have made a major leap in their economic 
development and improving their international economic positions in recent decades. Th e upsurge of their development 
occurred later in some cases and earlier in others (e.g. Finland managed it somewhat earlier than others). We did not 
attempt to defi ne whether they could be currently considered as core countries (there are arguments in favour in case of, e.g. 
Singapore and Ireland) or semi-periphery countries. What matters for their selection is the fact of their movement from the 
semi-periphery towards the core. Although statistics show in case of some of these countries a higher per capita GDP level 
than in some core group countries, none of them belongs to the sample of “old wealthy countries”. Th e selection included 
Singapore, Ireland, Finland, Israel, Taiwan and the Republic of Korea. 
Table 1 contains, in addition to data concerning these groups, comparable data on the “rising star”, China. 
Th e direct objects of our study are the semi-periphery countries. Internal shift s in the two other groups, those of leader 
countries and breakthrough countries, will not be addressed. Th e study will discuss only the state and dynamics of certain 
parameters of these groups compared with the semi-periphery economies’ group and its subgroups. 
Next we had to draft  a body of indicators based on the existing statistics and research data, where the central position would be 
occupied, according to our theoretical basic concept, by indicators characterising the integration of the countries’ economies 
into the international economic system and which would allow for the refl ection and analysis of shift s in the semi-periphery 
countries’ economic behaviour compared with the other groups of countries (the core countries’ and the breakthrough 
countries’ economies) and the improvement or deterioration of their relative position against the global setting. 
Most of the indicators used derive from the database used by the World Economic Forum (WEF),21 which have been 
complemented by other indicators from the UN, WB and OECD databases. Compared with the analyses made for the Global 
Competitiveness Reports the focus of the analysis has been signifi cantly modifi ed. 
21 Schwab K., (ed.) 2018. World Competitiveness Report 2017–2018, World Economic Forum, Geneva; Lopez-Claros A. (ed.), 2007. 
World Competitiveness Report 2006–2007, World Economic Forum, Geneva.
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Th e system of indicators comprises three blocks. Block 1: general conditions necessary for economic development. Th is 
includes three indicators for measuring the education level of the population and the index built by the WEF for measuring 
the institutional quality level of the environment. 
Block 2: indicators refl ecting the type of integration of the country’s economy in the international economy. Th is includes 
indicators like the share of export of GDP, the share of inward FDI stock of GDP, the balance of inward and outward FDI, 
expert opinion about how much FDIs in a specifi c country contribute to the development of the technological level (from 
the WEF database), and two indicators refl ecting the positioning of enterprises in the value chain (resulting from interviews 
with experts): the value chain breadth and control over international marketing channels. Combined with them, we also used 
indicators showing the nature of the products’ competitive advantage, the sophistication of the production process and the 
domestic clustering of enterprises as well as the innovation capability index of a country’s economy, used by the WEF.
Block 3: Indicators measuring output, the positioning of the state in the global ranking of per capita GDP plus the general 
competitiveness index of a country’s economy as used by the WEF (again expressed as the state’s global ranking).22 
Regarding the above there are comparable basic indicators for 2017 as well as 2006, i.e. the year preceding the global crisis. 
Th is permits analysis of the change of output indicators as well as the indicators of the fi rst two blocks across quite a long 
period, and building hypotheses about their mutual relation.
Since a majority of the indicators have been provided as rankings (see Table 1) it allows for the elimination of the eff ects 
caused by the short-term changes in the parameters of the business environment in the diff erent sub-stages of the cycle of 
the world economy. 
Semi-periphery economies from the viewpoint of per capita GDP level 
Th e groups of economies under observation contain the upper half and middle section of the countries usually treated as 
semi-periphery and are therefore quite homogeneous (USD 25,300–38,100 per capita, predominantly the range between 
USD 28,000 and 35,000 per capita). Th e extremes are, on the one hand, Spain and Malta in the Southern group and on the 
other hand, Croatia in the post-socialist countries group. In terms of global rankings the positions are between 30 and 54, 
aft er discarding extreme cases between positions 33 and 49. Top performers of the CEE group (the Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
Estonia) have even higher GDP per capita indicators than some of the countries from the Southern group (Greece and 
Portugal).
Th e diff erence in wealth between the leader countries and semi-periphery countries is apparent, but the gap between the 
wealthier ones in per capita GDP is not disastrously wide (4–5 thousand USD per capita). It is another matter that as far as 
the development indicators necessary for producing economic growth in semi-periphery countries with higher per capita 
GDP go (more about that further on), there is no ground for presuming that any of the semi-periphery countries represented 
in this table could pose a threat to the leader group as to per capita GDP or GNI within the next ten years, for example. 
To provide some background: some earlier breakthrough countries, which took off  from the semi or full periphery have 
already boosted their per capita GDP indicators not merely to the level of the leader countries, but compete with their elite—
Singapore, Ireland.
22 Th is index is composed on the bases of more than 120 separate indicators and is divided into 12 groups, so-called pillars 
(macro-economic situation, quality of institutions, position in diff erent markets, innovation, etc.).
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Semi-periphery economies from the aspect of fundamental development premises
We hereby refer to, fi rst, the general quality of institutions and, secondly, the standards of the education system. 
Institutions. Ratings of institutional quality23 bring out clear diff erences between the groups provided in the table. Th e semi-
periphery countries lag far behind the leader countries as well as the breakthrough countries (with the exception of Estonia, 
whose general index of institutional quality is above the corresponding indices of some breakthrough countries (South 
Korea, Taiwan)). Th e level of institutional development varies very widely in the group of semi-periphery countries being 
analysed, from 24th place in the global ranking to 102nd place, while the broadening of the range of variety has emerged in 
the past decade; it used to be almost half as wide. Particularly large diff erences in institutional quality can be observed in the 
CEE group of countries: from Estonia’s high level to low standards in Croatia, Hungary and Latvia. Th e Southern group of 
the semi-periphery countries is more homogeneous in that respect (while Greece lags behind the others).
When observing the dynamics of rankings of institutional development in the past decade we can notice contradictory 
tendencies; the indicators of institutional development have signifi cantly improved in some semi-periphery countries like 
the Czech Republic and Estonia, while they have very noticeably deteriorated in others like Croatia, Hungary, Latvia and 
Greece. 
Since sustainable progress in economic development, especially regarding catching up with the leader countries, is not 
possible without a high level of institutional development and constant adjustment according to circumstances, overcoming 
the crisis refl ected in the above fi gures may be an issue of existential signifi cance for some semi-periphery countries in the 
upcoming period. 
Education. Regarding the general duration of education of the people and using the world as a whole for the background, 
the countries of all four groups in the table can be considered countries with educated populations, yet there are noticeable 
diff erences between the groups. Th e diff erence between two groups of semi-periphery countries is conspicuous: while mean 
years of schooling in the CEE group vary generally between nine and 11, in the Southern group it varies between 11 and 13 
years. Th e only countries to confuse the pattern are Croatia and Cyprus; the years of schooling in Cyprus are closer to the 
CEE group and those in Croatia are closer to the Southern group of semi-periphery countries. 
Mean years of schooling of the top countries of the CEE group can actually rival that of such leader/core countries like the 
Netherlands, Japan and Sweden. However, the indicator of Germany, the US and Switzerland is higher still. 
Th e mean years of schooling indicators of the group of breakthrough countries vary between 11 and 13 years, thus within the 
same range as the CEE indicators; the fi gure is slightly lower only in Singapore, but the gap is not too wide. 
Th e duration of schooling of semi-periphery countries’ residents is signifi cantly longer than that of the periphery countries; 
this also applies to the states that, thanks to rapid economic growth, are either approaching the wealth level of semi-periphery 
countries or have already caught up with the semi-periphery league as to a number of indicators, e.g. India and China. 
Reaching the level of ten mean years of schooling is a major eff ort for countries rising from below; it is harder than preparing 
additional engineers, economists or other necessary specialists. 
23 Th e index of quality of institutions worked out by the World Economic Forum consists of 21 parameters including not only the 
components concerning the components with an intermediate impact on the business environment, such as property rights, quality 
of governmental regulations, etc., but also the same general parameters such as public trust in politicians, effi  ciency of government 
spending, and the reliability of police services. 
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In most of the Southern semi-periphery countries of Europe the length of schooling of the population lags behind not only 
the indicators typical of the core countries but also the breakthrough countries. Th is may become a potential bottleneck if 
these countries should try to climb to the core economies’ level in the future. It is not the case for CEE group states. 
While the medial length of the population’s schooling is an indicator showing the existence of a broad base for improving 
the state’s position in the international economy, the situation of the “higher end” of the population’s educational structure is 
shown more precisely by the share of labour of people with bachelor’s, master’s and doctor’s degrees. Th e importance of this 
indicator keeps increasing as the economy develops from straightforward production to more complex, innovation-based 
production. 
As for the share of people with higher education, the two groups of semi-periphery countries under observation form a 
relatively homogeneous body—24–32% of residents in the age of 25–64 years have at least a bachelor’s degree (or comparable 
degree). Th is is a very high ratio when compared with the entire world, not only with the periphery countries but also with 
the non-European semi-periphery countries. Th e top of the CEE group (Estonia, Latvia, Poland) display an indicator of 
roughly 30%, yet some countries of the same sub-group display approximately 23–25%, and in the Southern group states it 
remains between the two aforementioned fi gures. Regarding this indicator, the best of the semi-periphery countries observed 
ranks equal to some breakthrough countries and even some leader states.24 However, the share of people with university 
education is still higher (40% or more) among the leader countries the UK, Japan and the US and among the breakthrough 
countries of South Korea and Israel.
Th e ratings of the quality of the education system regarding its adequacy to the requirements of economy are extremely 
variable, but generally tend to be critical/negative. Th is especially applies to the CEE countries. While this adequacy is judged 
as relatively good in Estonia, satisfactory in the Czech Republic, Malta and Portugal, a number of states like Slovakia, Croatia, 
Hungary and Greece are very critical in their judgments. Background: the leader and breakthrough countries generally rate 
the education system’s quality from the economy’s viewpoint as good (Switzerland, the US, Singapore, Finland have higher 
ratings), while Japan is somewhat more critical.
Discussions about reconciling the economy’s needs and the education system, especially in the CEE countries, frequently 
hear the counterargument to accusations that the education system no longer meets the needs of the economy and that youth 
study “unnecessary” specialties—this mismatch has been caused by the economic policy resulting in an excessively primitive 
economic structure of the state, incapable of off ering youth suffi  ciently attractive and lucrative jobs.
Semi-periphery economies from the viewpoint of openness to the world economy 
All the countries on the table are members of the WTO, which by itself should ensure a certain compliance with the rules 
of an open economy. Viewing the actual role of international trade and international investments in the economies of these 
countries obviously reveals diff erences between the states25 but in principle they all can be described as countries that have 
staked on surviving/succeeding in the global economy and exports.
24 Germany pays great attention to applied technical education; accordingly the share of university education among the population is 
lower than in other leader states.
25 It is a statistical regularity that the share of exports in the economy is signifi cantly lower in large countries with large domestic 
markets compared with small countries. Th e producers in small countries are oft en forced to turn to exports since the domestic 
market lacks consumers for larger-scale production.
58
Th e share of exports in the economy
Among the semi-periphery economies, the CEE group forms a homogeneous block in that respect. Regarding the share of 
exports in GDP, only Croatia and Poland stand out in the predominant pattern (exports amount to 60–90% of GDP, a very 
high indicator internationally) with their lower fi gures, while in Poland’s case it can be partially explained with the greater 
volume of the domestic market thanks to the larger population. (Compared with other large countries, the share of Poland’s 
exports of GDP—53%—is not actually low, it is signifi cantly higher than that of, e.g. Spain.)
Th e Southern semi-periphery group is also quite homogeneous in that respect, but if we omit the small island state of Malta, 
which is peculiar in several aspects, the predominant range of export share in this group is signifi cantly lower than that of 
the CEE group and remains between 33% and 63%. Against the EU countries’ background this could be considered a more 
or less average share of exports (the EU countries’ average in 2017 was 45%). Considering that these are EU member states 
and a clear majority of members’ trade occurs with other EU countries, this statistic also clearly indicates that although the 
CEE countries entered the EU integration processes later than the cohesion countries, by now they have been integrated into 
the EU economic space more closely than the aforementioned group, at least as far as the ratio of export volume and GDP 
volume goes. It is another matter, however, how profi tably the countries of either group have entered the international value 
chains. Th is subject will be addressed in the following parts of the article.
To provide some background, let us view the signifi cance of exports in the countries of the leader group and the “breakthrough 
group”. Th e US and Japan stand out among the leaders as to their lower share of exports in GDP, but here we have to keep in 
mind that these are very large economies and their share of exports in the range of 10–20% means very large export volumes 
of great signifi cance for the world economy. It is true that both of these leader countries have lost a noticeable share of the 
world market to the new emerging power of China in recent decades. 
A more complicated issue, especially when considered within the paradigm developed by Wallerstein, is whether the core 
economies of the contemporary world, especially world powers enjoying the status of core economies, are actually striving to 
seize the position of a dominant export leader similarly to what Great Britain once used to occupy. Aft er all, there are other 
and better methods of domination, primarily the control of capital fl ow. Another aspect of the problem is that the regulation 
of complex domestic economic processes is becoming increasingly complicated in large countries with highly developed 
economies and for that reason the issues of goods and services exports will shift  to lower positions in economic policies. 
Statistics concerning the group of countries we designate as breakthrough countries provides a clear indication of the 
importance of export success in rising from semi-periphery countries to core countries. With the exception of Israel, in which 
case the realisation of export orientation is obstructed by clearly geopolitical factors, i.e. a hostile political environment, all 
the countries viewed in this group are very strong exporters, in past decades as well as currently. Th e economic structure of 
Singapore and Ireland is especially clearly export-oriented; the share of exports in these countries is much higher than in 
the strongest exporters of the CEE region. However, when using the breakthrough countries as role models for the present 
semi-periphery countries, we face the question of how likely the mobilisation of the population and the state is as a whole for 
achieving export success in the present-day world, which operates under diff erent ideologies. Th e earlier success stories were 
achieved by using strongly corporate and, compared with today, more state-centred mechanisms (coordinated capitalism 
versus liberal capitalism); this apples to European states as well (Ireland, Finland).
Th e economic policy of the PRC has paid more attention in recent years to supporting domestic development and avoiding 
disproportions, but we certainly cannot argue that China’s position on the world market has deteriorated due to it. Th e 
approximately 20% share of exports in GDP means, considering the size of the country, a clear leader’s position in world 
exports. 
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Foreign direct investments (FDI)
When comparing the signifi cance of the FDI stock in the economies of diff erent countries, we can notice considerable 
diff erences. Among the semi-periphery countries, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Hungary stand out in the CEE group 
with a higher share of FDI, while Cyrus displays ultra-high FDI stock, hinting at a completely diff erent economic model, in 
the Southern group of the semi-periphery. Th eir opposites are countries with a low signifi cance of FDI—Slovenia, Lithuania 
and especially Greece and Malta. Among the remaining nine countries the share of FDI stock of GDP remains in the range of 
45–67%; this span, which could be considered mainstream in the EU semi-periphery countries, is signifi cantly higher than 
the EU average, which remains slightly below 40%. While in the case of Greece the low level could be partly considered a 
side eff ect of the complicated post-economic crisis situation, and the other divergences from the aforementioned mainstream 
zone can only be caused by deliberate economic policies with their diff erent emphases. 
An analysis of inward FDI does not suffi  ce an explanation of the countries’ role in the world economy, and the ratio of 
inward and outward FDI is highly important as well. Th e situation is relatively similar in the CEE countries with the volume 
of outward FDI being signifi cantly lower than that of inward FDI; in some countries like Slovakia, Poland and Latvia, it is 
more or less a magnitude lower. Th e long-term persistence of this proportion testifi es to a country’s peripheral position in 
the international economy. Th is proportion is slightly better in Estonia, but outward FDI here is still less than one-third of 
inward FDI.
Inward and outward FDIs are better balanced in the Southern group of semi-periphery countries. Th ey are more or less 
balanced in Spain and Cyprus, and in Portugal and Greece the incoming FDI stock  is higher than that of the outward 
investments, but the former exceeds the latter by about two times rather than by an order of magnitude. Malta is a special 
case with a very small number of inward FDIs.
Further opportunities for understanding the subject can be found in an analysis of expert opinions carried out by the 
World Economic Forum, where experts of given countries were asked how their inward FDIs contributed to improving the 
sophistication and competitiveness of their respective countries’ economies. Th e diff erences of opinion were quite telling. 
While the interviewed experts from Slovakia, Portugal, and to a slightly lower extent from Lithuania and Spain tended to 
agree with the statement, the experts from Croatia, Slovenia, Latvia, Greece and Cyprus expressed a rather resolute opposite 
opinion. When comparing the replies to the question in 2007 and in 2017,26 a rather general negative dynamic becomes 
apparent among the CEE countries. Estimates had become signifi cantly more positive only in two countries, Lithuania and 
Poland, out of eight (the experts of the Czech Republic were not asked this question in 2007). Th e opinions had become 
signifi cantly more negative in Estonia, Slovakia, Hungary and Latvia. Th ey had turned very slightly more positive in Croatia 
yet remained in the highly negative zone. Th e negative dynamic of opinions in Estonia and Hungary in particular is a sign 
of danger. Th e share of inward FDIs has been very high in these countries for a long time, they had been considered testing 
grounds for this model of FDI-based development, and the opinions and expectations concerning FDIs in the modernisation 
of the economy had been highly positive ten years ago. If we believe the experts we have to conclude that the development 
model heavily relying on FDIs had serious fl aws. 
Relation between the quality of basic premises and the dynamic of economic development rankings 
In the following we shall look at whether we can observe some connections between improving the economic positions and 
such premises of economic development such as educational level indicators and the quality of the institutional environment.
Education. We had the hypothesis that since the education indicators in the Southern group countries varied highly as per 
country, one could presume considerable variation in these countries’ economic performance as well. Th e hypothesis was 
only partially confi rmed. Malta and Cyprus can boast the best education indicators of this group. Malta was indeed one of 
26 Th is is possible only in case of some countries under observation.
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the countries that had improved their economic position within the past decade, while that of Cyprus had remained roughly 
the same. But Portugal, Spain and Greece with lower education indicators had also yielded ground in economic development 
indicators. 
In general, education indicators should not become bottlenecks in making economic progress in the CEE countries group; 
the problem may instead lie in education system features and economic requirements being better matched. However, it can 
be observed here that Croatia and Hungary, which report lower education indicators than the others, have also lost their 
positions in the economic wealth rankings.
Institutions. Two facts should be underscored. First: the positions of all semi-periphery countries under observation with 
the exception of Estonia and Malta in the institutional environment quality rankings are much lower than those in the 
economic wealth ranking; in some cases the gap is very wide. Secondly: more than half of the countries under observation 
have experienced a decline of the institutional environment ranking in the past decade. Th e exceptions are only the Czech 
Republic and Estonia with a positive shift , and Poland and Malta with no negative or positive trend. All that should indicate 
that the semi-periphery countries still have a lot to do to prevent the institutional environment from obstructing economic 
development. Yet there is no reason to presume that the quality of the institutional environment or positive dynamic in that 
respect would necessarily ensure rapid economic progress. A clearly determined positive connection between these indicators 
could be observed only in a very limited number of cases (Czech Republic, Malta). A positive example from the institutional 
viewpoint is Estonia with its best index of institutional environment quality among the semi-periphery countries, which kept 
improving within the past ten years, yet the country was nevertheless incapable of advancing its position in the ranking based 
on per capita GDP. 
Relation between the type of participation in the international economy and the dynamic of economic development 
rankings
As we already described earlier, all the semi-periphery countries under observation are in fact export-oriented to a lesser or 
greater degree—the CEE countries, however, more so than the countries of the Southern group. Th e share of exports did not 
increase or decline very signifi cantly during the hard times of the observation period. Since this period, especially the years 
of the global crisis, were unfavourable for exports, it granted at least a theoretical advantage to countries with a large domestic 
market. It is possible that this eff ect helped Poland, but judging by the end results, probably not Spain. 
Th e countries under observation diff ered signifi cantly as to the share of FDI stock in GDP. It is not possible to claim that 
CEE countries with a higher or somewhat lower share of FDI were more successful in the past decade. Among the high FDI-
share countries, the Czech Republic improved its position while that of Hungary and Croatia deteriorated and that of Estonia 
remained unchanged. Slovenia with its low share of FDI was clearly unsuccessful during this period. Among the countries of 
the Southern group, Cyprus and Malta with their high share of FDI were more successful than others.
When analysing the opinions of the countries’ expert groups on whether or not FDI contributes to the development of the 
technological development of a country’s economy, we can see a clearly negative shift  in estimates in the CEE countries. Th e 
opinions have become more negative in all countries with the exception of Poland and Lithuania where the share of FDI 
is the CEE group’s average. A diff erent tendency is apparent in the Southern group of the semi-periphery countries. Th e 
corresponding opinions have become positive in all countries of the group except for crisis-stricken Greece. 
A majority of the CEE group countries display a characteristic combination of high export-orientation and a high share of 
inward FDI, while the positions of outward FDI are weak in this group. In such a situation the critically important question 
is whether or not the country’s enterprises can acquire functions in the international value chains that would grant them 
opportunities to earn adequate income and develop.
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In practically all semi-periphery countries under observation, their weakness is the position in the international value chains 
and controlling them. With the exception of the Spanish experts’ judgment on value chain breadth in their country, we 
fi nd in no country in either group of semi-periphery countries an expert group opinion of value chain breadth or control 
of international distribution, which would be even slightly above average against the background of the global evaluation 
panel (among the 30 top ratings given by diff erent countries’ expert groups when answering these questions and evaluating 
their countries’ situation). Low positions in value chains almost automatically result in specialisation in predominantly those 
products and services where the competitive advantage is the low-cost input rather than more sophisticated and high-quality 
products and services and where the production processes are simple rather than complex. 
Compared with the enterprises of the Southern group countries the positions of the CEE countries in value chains are weaker 
and the dynamic in that sphere is more negative. Regarding value chain breadth the positions of all CEE countries have 
deteriorated if we can rely on the experts’ opinions. Th e dynamic of most countries of this group in control of marketing 
channels is also negative in this decade, although with some exceptions (incl. the Czech Republic). Among the Southern 
group countries, all except Greece are judged to be currently in a better state regarding acquiring wider functions in value 
chains than they used to be ten years ago. 
Th e position in value chains is also closely related to the opportunity to develop and realise the innovation capability of 
the economy. Th e indices characterising the innovation capability of economies of the members of both groups are not too 
high either, yet the overall picture is not fully negative. Th e innovation index of several CEE countries (Estonia, and to a 
smaller extent Slovenia and the Czech Republic), and among the Southern group countries, Portugal is quite respectable 
when compared with countries of a similar wealth level, yet this rather high innovation capability cannot be realised in the 
economic outcomes, probably due to the low positions in the international value chains. 
Th e innovativeness rankings of the Southern group’s countries are in all cases lower than the rankings of wealth. 
Can the competitiveness index predict the growth of economic wealth? 
It could be logically presumed that states with a higher competitiveness index at the beginning of the period would improve 
their ranking in the per capita GDP rankings by the end of the period, i.e. the competitiveness index should permit forecasting 
the changes in the states’ wealth rankings. Do the developments in the semi-periphery countries in the last decade confi rm 
this hypothesis? 
In the beginning we look at the state and dynamics of country groups and countries as to the per capita GDP indicator and 
competitiveness index. 
At the beginning of the period under observation, in 2006, the per capita GDP rankings of the semi-periphery countries 
under observation extended from 26th place (Spain) to 54th (Croatia). Th e Southern and CEE semi-periphery groups diff ered 
very clearly—the former was much wealthier than the latter. Th e sole exception was the wealthiest member of the CEE group 
at that time, Slovenia—its per capita GDP surpassed the bottom members of the Southern group, Malta and Portugal. 
Th e divergence of the semi-periphery economies in the world ranking based on competitiveness indices (2007) was 
even minimally larger, ranking between 25th (Estonia) and 51st (again Croatia); however, this indicator does not enable 
diff erentiation between two distinct sub-groups of semi-periphery countries. Th e competitiveness indicators of the CEE 
group countries, although their divergence is quite high within the sub-group, tend to be even better than those of the 
Southern group. Th e positions of most CEE countries in the competitiveness rankings are better than their places in rankings 
based on per capita GDP levels. Th e competitiveness of the Czech Republic is only one notch below Spain, the best performer 
of the Southern group. Th e lowest competitive indices in the Southern group countries are those of Greece and Cyprus, and 
in the CEE group of Croatia and Slovakia. 
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When studying the 2017 rankings of economic wealth we can see only minimum blending among the Southern and CEE 
groups during the ten-year period. All CEE countries with the exception of Croatia have surpassed crisis-struck Greece, and 
the Czech Republic with its highest per capita GDP level among the CEE countries has also left  Portugal behind. Slovenia, 
too, despite its not too successful development, ended the period at a per capita GDP level slightly above that of Portugal. 
However, on the whole the Southern group has remained somewhat wealthier than the CEE group. 
Within the CEE group, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Lithuania have signifi cantly improved their positions in the 
global per capita GDP rankings, and the positions of Slovenia and Hungary have noticeably deteriorated, while the others 
have retained their previous positions or have undergone only minimal changes, 1–2 notches. Portugal and Malta have 
improved their positions in the Southern group, and Spain and especially Greece have fallen, while Cyprus has approximately 
maintained its previous ranking.
When viewing the European semi-periphery group as a whole, we notice that its internal divergence has remained more or 
less unchanged; the per capita GDP positions of the countries within the group now spread between 33rd and 54th places. 
Th e whole span of the global ranking where the semi-periphery countries are located as to their economic wealth has shift ed 
downward; the current position of the wealthiest country (Malta) in the ranking is lower than that of the former wealthiest 
country (Spain) while the position of the lowest-wealth country has dropped as well (Croatia in 2006 and 2017). In other 
words, from the global viewpoint Europe’s semi-periphery has rather shown retrograde dynamics during the decade.
We witness even worse dynamics when looking at the competitiveness rankings. While the best performer of Europe’s semi-
periphery (Spain) occupied 20th place in the global ranking of this indicator in 2007, the present best (the Czech Republic) 
ranks 25th. While the weakest performer (Croatia) held 51st place in 2007, the current country of lowest competitiveness 
(Greece) ranks 54th. Th e length of the span in the global ranking where these countries are located according to this indicator 
has actually shrunk, but the span itself has shift ed downward. 
Th e rankings of all Southern group members according to competitiveness are currently worse than the rankings based on 
economic wealth and leave little hope for a leap in their economies during the upcoming period. Th e position of the top of 
the CEE group (the Czech Republic, Estonia) in the global competitiveness ranking is better than in the economic wealth 
ranking, although the diff erence in case of the Czech Republic is a couple of notches. 
How strong then was the connection between the competitiveness index as the premise and the economic growth as the result? 
We have to admit that the predictions based on the competitiveness index were only partially realised. Within the CEE 
countries’ group this index allowed for the rise of the Czech Republic in the economic wealth ranking and the decline of 
Hungary and Croatia to be predicted, which all took place, yet it would have been impossible to foresee the slowing of 
Estonia’s progress or the rise of Slovakia and Lithuania according to their positions in the 2007 competitiveness index. 
As for the Southern group, the weak positions in the competitiveness index signalled the upcoming hard times for Greece 
and Cyprus. In reality Greece indeed dropped, yet the per capita GDP position of Cyprus remained practically unchanged. 
Th e index could have predicted the improvement of the economic positions of Spain and Portugal. In reality, however, Malta 
showed the best improvement of economic position while Spain’s position deteriorated signifi cantly. 
Th e issue of the usability of the competitiveness index in forecasting needs more detailed analysis that would also study the 
more precise dynamic of the index, determine the length of the time lag between the changes of its individual components 
and the impact on real economy, etc., but based on the analysis presented here we can argue that the predictability of the 
competitiveness index has been rather limited, at least so far. Accordingly, some factors either absent from the makeup of 
the WEF competitiveness index or underrepresented there do not allow the internationally quite high competitiveness 
index of some countries under observation to be realised in economic growth, in other words, they enable the semi-
periphery countries to catch up with the core countries. Proceeding from Wallerstein’s theory, these factors could be 
sought among the indicators refl ecting the connections of the semi-periphery countries with the hierarchically arranged 
world economic system. 
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General conclusions (Does the semi-periphery persist in Europe and how is it doing?)
Summation of the results of the empirical analysis and their comparison with the existing theoretical background allows for 
reaching the following basic conclusions:
a) Conclusions about core-periphery relations in general (global picture)
  Based on the developments of the past ten years one can argue that the division into the periphery, the semi-periphery 
and the core is predominantly persistent. One can observe a certain weakening of the positions of the dominant core 
(leader) economies during the past ten years, but this can mainly be explained by two reasons. First, a number of countries 
specialising in the production of oil and gas have risen among the world’s wealthiest economies. These countries’ other 
development premises for maintaining their positions long-term are not high. Secondly, the People’s Republic of China 
has begun to play a significantly larger role in the world economy, having reinforced its positions in exports and the 
financing of international economics while attempting to have greater say in global politics. China’s several premises give 
reason to believe that the growth of its economy and the strengthening of its positions may continue, despite recently 
slowing down. Yet China has only reached/is reaching the world average level as to the per capita wealth indicators, while 
its several other development indicators correspond more to those of the bottom half of semi-periphery countries (e.g. 
mean years of schooling indicator). 
  Out of the group of countries this study describes as breakthrough countries of an earlier period, i.e. striving from among 
semi-periphery to core economies, two, namely Singapore and the Republic of Ireland, have established themselves as 
some of the wealthiest states in the world. Their development indicators are more uneven than those of the old core 
countries yet by now they can be considered as definite core economies. However, both are relatively small countries/
economies, and therefore their addition does not significantly change the general geo-economic picture. 
  It is telling that as to the competitiveness index all seven leading core economy countries studied in the analysis 
maintained their position among the world’s top ten throughout the observation period. Holding the key position of 
the core economies is supported by a favourable position in the global value chains and control over them, very high 
technological development and high innovation capability of the economy, as well as indicators characterising very high 
education standards. However, some signals of drawbacks are sent by the level of the institutional development index, 
which is in the countries of this group at the world top 20 level, rather than among the top 10. 
b) Empirical conclusions about the semi-periphery group of countries
  When judging according to GDP dynamics or competitiveness index changes, the general difference between the two 
groups of Europe-based semi-periphery countries, the CEE countries and the Southern group, has not significantly 
increased, and neither has there been any considerable mixing of the two. The top performers of the CEE group have 
passed the weakest of the Southern group, yet this is no reason to claim that the CEE group has been more successful; 
the Southern group as a whole is more even, with Greece being the sole exception. Both groups have their laggards and 
leaders (Greece and Croatia as the laggards and the Czech Republic and Malta as the top performers). It can be stated, 
however, that the European semi-periphery group has generally maintained in the past decade its homogeneity when 
compared with other groups of countries like the core countries, breakthrough countries and periphery countries. 
  The greatest weaknesses in practically all semi-periphery countries are unfavourable positioning in the international value 
chains and controlling them. Low positions in value chains almost automatically results in specialisation in predominantly 
those products and services where the competitive advantage is the cheap input rather than more sophisticated and high-
quality products and services and where the production processes are simple rather than complex. The situations of semi-
periphery and core economies are totally different in that respect.
Th e indices characterising the innovation capability of economies in several countries under observation (especially Estonia, 
as well as Slovenia and the Czech Republic and Portugal) are quite respectable when compared with countries of similar 
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wealth levels, yet the innovation capability cannot be realised in the economic outcomes due to the low positions in the 
international value chains. 
Th e weak position in the value chains is apparently one of the reasons why the positions of the semi-periphery countries 
viewed as a whole have deteriorated rather than improved in global rankings. Th e CEE countries especially have placed high 
stakes on exports, but fi guratively speaking they have been trapped as producers in unpromising links of value chains.27 
  It can be stated in general that the specific features of semi-periphery countries, despite the aforementioned differences, 
exists nevertheless and therefore it makes sense to continue using the category of semi-periphery and analyses based on it. 
There is currently no ground allowing for forecasting whether the polarisation in the world economy into periphery and 
core economies will continue or even increase and the emergence of the semi-periphery will remain somewhat anomalous 
or whether a stronger emergence of the semi-periphery would occur. The world has seen in the past two or three decades 
cases of some countries, although not large economies, having moved from the semi-periphery to the core; one very large 
country, China, has recently moved on from the periphery to the semi-periphery and is continuing its progress. The latter 
process may turn into a geo-economic game-changer. However, the analysis of European developments taking place 
during the past ten years does not provide for optimism about a European semi-periphery country being able to 
make it to the “top league” within the predictable future. 
Some theoretical conclusions
  Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory, which proceeds from the postulate of an inert hierarchic structure, claims that when 
ascending from one hierarchic “layer of economy” to another, the higher one is extremely difficult, while an opposing 
hypothesis based on the “catching-up” mindset postulates that the economies’ development gaps will inevitably shrink 
in “normal conditions” under an international free market and that economies will conform. Actual developments can 
provide evidence to support either theory, and therefore it should be practical to carry on with both hypotheses, asking in 
either case what the factors are due to which the theoretical premises under observation are not realised or are realised very 
slowly. When testing the catching-up-type logic, we can ask which factors inhibiting mechanisms operated to obstruct 
the convergence and how we could make the theory more adequate by including these mechanisms in it. We could also 
act the opposite way and start from the concept that moving from one layer to a higher one is practically impossible 
for certain reasons. Having witnessed that some countries have succeeded in it, we have to substantiate this aberration 
from the hypothesis of the closedness of layers, to show the limitations of the closedness hypothesis. In either case the 
initial theoretical platform is modified towards greater realism. It cannot be ruled out that this will eventually lead to the 
formulation of a new synthetic platform. 
  The catching-up mindset in its purest form, which argues that all it takes to catch up with the advanced economies 
is the implementation of free market policies and elementary institutions for ensuring order, is a huge and not-too-
credible simplification. The more or less mainstream mindset is represented by the theory that an economic system passes 
through various stages in its development, and moving from one stage to another requires additional reorganisation 
efforts, including state support. As Michael Porter argues, in order to transit from the less sophisticated, efficiency-
driven stage of development to innovation-based development, a knowledge economy, certain rearrangement of the 
27 Th e outcomes correspond quite well to somewhat pessimistic conclusions recently reached by Roman Stöllinger (Stöllinger R., 
2018. Change in Functional Specialisation Patterns: Key to Escaping the Semi-Periphery Trap WIIW Spring Seminar, 12 April 
2018), namely that Europe’s semi-periphery countries have quite closely integrated into the European production networks but they 
are highly dependent on foreign fi rms. Th e hierarchical relationship between the countries of the core and periphery persists. Th e 
number of global players among semi-periphery countries is minuscule. Th is results in the CEE countries being trapped in low value 
creation and in the semi-periphery. At the presently functioning specialisation pattern the catching-up process is obstructed and 
these countries no longer have opportunities to break through into the core. 
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education system, state-supported innovation policies and other measures are necessary. This can essentially be seen as 
modernisation and further development of the catching-up mindset. In other words: it is sufficient for succeeding if you 
adapt to the international market, but will develop more sophisticated institutions and carry out an amplified innovation 
policy. The expert opinions organised by the World Economic Forum and the regular Global Competitiveness Reports 
have been based on such a mindset. The introduction of Michael Porter’s logic of stages28 is unquestionably an important 
step ahead, but it also seems that the logic of this analysis has still underestimated the difficulties related to achieving a 
better position in international value chains. The analysis provided in this article shows as well that the countries whose 
(key) enterprises do not control these chains as a rule cannot find activities there that would enable higher productivity. 
The established international value chains are some the most rigid elements among the factors limiting opportunities for 
economic development. Therefore the theories based on hierarchic structure of the economic system, including that of 
Wallerstein, add the necessary elements of realism in concepts of developmental economics. Using the category of semi-
periphery economies has an important place in such reasoning. 
28 Porter M.E., 1990. Th e Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: Th e Free Press and Macmillan Press, 1990.
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